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This study evaluates the economic effects of corporate tax coordination in the enlarged European 
Union using a computable general equilibrium model and a comprehensive set of scenarios for 
both a common corporate EU tax base and for full harmonisation of tax bases and tax rates. Our 
main findings are as follows: (i) Corporate tax coordination can yield modest aggregate welfare 
gains, but the details of the coordination policies determine outcomes and economic gains cannot 
be taken for granted. (ii) All scenarios for coordination leave some EU Member States as 
winners and others as losers. An agreement on tax coordination is therefore likely to require 
elaborate compensation mechanisms. (iii) The large and diverse country effects suggest that 
Enhanced Cooperation for a subset of the Member States may be the most likely route towards 
tax coordination. Coordination among a subset of relatively homogenous Member States will 
lead to less radical policy changes, but also to smaller gains. (iv) Identifying winners and losers 
from coordination for the purpose of a compensation mechanism may be problematic, since 
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 The Dilemmas of Tax Coordination 
in the Enlarged European Union 
 





A basic goal of the European Union is to create an integrated European 
economy where the free flows of goods, services and factors of production are not 
distorted by national economic policies. Ever since the inception of the EU, it has 
been recognized that differences in national tax systems may cause a misallocation 
of resources within the Union. To eliminate such tax-induced distortions, the 
European Commission, as well as several independent experts, have repeatedly 
called for various forms of tax coordination within the EU. 
In particular, there have been many proposals for coordination of the 
corporate tax systems of the Member States. Already in 1962, the Neumark 
Committee proposed a common imputation system with a split corporate tax rate for 
retained and distributed profits. By contrast, the Tempel report of 1970 suggested a 
common classical system of corporate taxation. In 1975, the European Commission 
proposed a directive providing for corporate tax rates to fall within a range of 45-55 
percent, a partial imputation system and a common 25 percent withholding tax on 
dividends. In 1988 the Commission proceeded with draft proposals for a harmonised 
corporate tax base, and in 1992 an expert committee chaired by Onno Ruding 
suggested minimum and maximum standards for corporate tax rates and tax bases in 
                                                 
1 This paper is an extension of a study carried out for the European Commission (see Copenhagen Economics, 
2004). The original study was completed while Jesper Jensen and Patrik Svensson worked for Copenhagen 
Economics. The paper reflects the views of the authors. The European Commission is not liable for any use 
that may be made of the information contained in the paper. Thanks are due to the European Commission’s 
steering group for the original study, Matthias Mors and Christian Keuschnigg. We also appreciate comments 
from Andrew Haughwout and other participants in the IFIR-CESifo conference on “New Directions in Fiscal 
Federalism” in Lexington, Kentucky, September 14-16, 2006. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the 
authors. 
2 the EU. More recently, the Commission put forward alternative proposals for the 
introduction of a common consolidated tax base for European multinationals 
(European Commission, 2001a). 
However, although the Commission has had some success in alleviating 
international double taxation in the sphere of corporate taxation (mainly via the 
Parent-Subsidiary directive and the Interest and Royalties directive), none of the 
more ambitious proposals for harmonisation or coordination mentioned above have 
been adopted by the EU Member States.
2 By identifying some fundamental 
dilemmas for EU tax coordination, the present study may help to explain why 
progress on coordination has been so slow. Thus we show that while the EU-wide 
economic gains from tax harmonisation arise from differences in the national tax 
systems, these differences also imply that some Member States are bound to lose 
from harmonisation. Given the current unanimity rule for tax policy decisions in the 
EU, harmonisation is therefore unlikely to occur unless the winners can somehow 
compensate the losers. But this raises another dilemma: According to our analysis 
the countries experiencing gains in GDP and welfare will also tend to lose tax 
revenue as a result of tax harmonisation, whereas Member States suffering a loss of 
GDP and welfare will actually tend to gain additional tax revenue. Hence it seems 
unlikely that the governments of the former countries will be willing and able to 
transfer resources to the governments of the latter countries. 
Our analysis is based on an elaborate computable general equilibrium model 
comprising all the 25 current Member States of the EU plus ten additional countries 
representing the rest of the world. To our knowledge, the present paper is the first 
study to undertake a quantitative analysis of tax coordination in the enlarged 
European Union, accounting for economic interactions between the EU and the rest 
of the world, and allowing for a rich variety of assets and alternative tax instruments. 
Thus the present study extends previous quantitative studies of tax coordination in 
the EU based on more aggregated and stylized models, such as the papers by 
                                                 
2  For recent status reports on company tax coordination in Europe, see European Commission (2003) and 
Nicodème (2006). 
3 Mendoza and Tesar (1998, 2005), Sørensen (2000, 2001a, 2004a, 2004c) and 
Bettendorf et al. (2006).
3
 The next main section describes our simulation model, and section 3 lays 
out the various scenarios for tax coordination to be considered. Section 4 presents 
and discusses the simulated effects of alternative policy scenarios. Our main 
conclusions are summarized in section 5 which also raises some caveats. The 
appendix provides a more detailed documentation of our results. 
 
2. The model 
Our evaluation of policy scenarios for tax coordination is based on CETAX, a 
simulation model building on the OECDTAX model developed by Peter Birch 
Sørensen (Sørensen, 2001b; 2004b). The OECDTAX model was constructed 
specifically for the purpose of studying international coordination of capital income 
taxation. It has already been applied to a range of policy issues such as corporate tax 
harmonization in the EU, corporate tax reform in Germany and shifts between 
corporate taxes and taxes on labour (Sørensen, 2002; 2004a; 2004b). 
The CETAX model extends the OECDTAX model in two ways. First, while the 
original OECDTAX model incorporated 24 OECD countries, including the 15 ‘old’ 
EU Member States, the CETAX model includes all new Member States, covering 
the whole EU25 plus nine other OECD countries and a tax haven jurisdiction.
4 
Second, the model database has been extended to account both for the geographical 
extension with the new Member States and for new model features, including the tax 
systems of the new Member States and a more detailed modelling of transaction 
costs associated with foreign portfolio investment.
5
                                                 
3 The CORTAX model developed by Bettendorf et al. (2006) is a simplified version of the model presented 
here. The CORTAX model only includes 17 EU countries and no countries representing the rest of the world. 
Moreover, unlike our model, the CORTAX model assumes that the EU cannot affect the international returns 
on stocks and bonds, and it abstracts from the housing market, financial institutions, labour market 
imperfections and tax havens. 
4
 The other OECD countries included in the model are Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey and the United States. 
5 These transactions costs are now calibrated on a bilateral country-by country basis in order to generate a more 
realistic pattern of cross-country investment in debt instruments. 
4 2.1 General model features
6
The CETAX model is a CGE model describing the international spill-over 
effects of national tax policies via the world capital market. Each country in the 
model includes a household sector, a business sector and a government, and all 
countries are linked together via international capital markets and trade in goods and 
services. The model features private portfolio composition, endogenous corporate 
financial policies, incorporation of a housing market, a distinction between foreign 
direct investment and foreign portfolio investment, explicit modelling of the 
financial sector and a detailed description of tax systems. The model can be used 
both to analyse the effects of unilateral changes in tax policies and various forms of 
international tax coordination.  
The CETAX model is static, describing a stationary equilibrium. It includes 
35 countries representing the European Union and the Rest of the World (ROW). 
One country in the ROW is a tax haven that facilitates tax evasion. Each country 
produces the same homogeneous good, which is traded in an integrated international 
goods market. Labour is immobile across countries, whereas capital is imperfectly 
mobile. The supply of capital to an individual country is thus an increasing function 
of the rate of return offered in that country. By parametrically varying the elasticity 
of substitution between assets invested in different countries, one can vary the 
degree of capital mobility and approximate a situation of perfect mobility. The 
model is specifically designed to allow for higher capital mobility within the EU 
than between the EU and the ROW. 
 
2.2. Households 
Households in each country must choose between immediate and postponed 
consumption, and the utility-maximising consumer increases his total saving as the 
after-tax real rate of return increases. Hence the total supply of capital is 
endogenous. 
                                                                                                                                           
 
6 This section outlines the main features of our model. An exhaustive analytical description of the model can be 
found in the OECDTAX model documentation (Sørensen, 2001b). 
 
5 Having optimized his total saving, the consumer divides his funds between 
investment in housing equity and financial saving. In the next step, he allocates 
financial saving between institutional saving and ‘household saving’. Household 
saving includes direct household purchases of stocks and debt instruments, including 
bank deposits. Institutional saving incorporates financial saving channelled through 
pension funds and life insurance companies, plus pension savings via the banking 
and corporate sectors. 
In a subsequent step, household financial saving is allocated between stocks 
and interest-bearing assets, denoted ‘bonds’ for convenience. Each of these two 
aggregates must then be allocated between domestic and foreign assets which in turn 
must be allocated between assets issued in the EU region and assets issued in the 
ROW. In the final stage, the portfolio is split into assets issued in the individual 
countries. The institutional savings are allocated across similar asset types in a 
similar manner. 
In addition to supplying capital (savings) to the domestic and international 
capital markets, households supply labour to domestic and international firms 
operating in the domestic economy. Wages and working hours are set by trade 
unions whose market power generates involuntary unemployment. By incorporating 
labour market imperfections, the model thus addresses the concern of policy makers 




Businesses are modelled as either purely domestic firms with no 
international operations or as multinational parent companies with fully owned 
subsidiaries in each of the other countries of the world. Each country is endowed 
with a fixed stock of intangible assets representing e.g. human capital and 
management know-how. A fraction of these assets is held by multinationals, the rest 
by domestic firms. Domestic firms issue debt to domestic and foreign investors. The 
equity shares in these firms are not traded internationally, but are held only by 
domestic households. 
By contrast, multinational corporations issue shares as well as debt 
instruments to foreign as well as domestic household and institutional investors. The 
6 multinational parent companies inject equity into foreign subsidiaries, representing 
foreign direct investment, and provide their subsidiaries with intermediate inputs. 
Subsidiaries also borrow in the host country capital market. Factor demands and 
financial policies are chosen to maximize global after-tax profits. Multinationals 
have the possibility to engage in transfer pricing to shift taxable profits between 
parent and subsidiaries. In setting their transfer prices, multinationals trade off the 
organizational cost of distorted input prices against the tax advantage of shifting 
profits into low-tax jurisdictions.
7  
 
2.4. The public sector 
The government of each country provides infrastructure, other public goods 
and income transfers. Public expenditures are financed through a long list of direct 
taxes on capital and labour as well as via indirect taxes on goods and services. 
Real world tax codes are complex, distinguishing between e.g. foreign direct 
investment and foreign portfolio investment, between household investors and 
institutional investors, between housing investment and financial investment, 
between current income and capital gains, and between debt and equity. Moreover, 
while some types of foreign investment are taxed in the country of source, other 
income types are taxed in the investor’s country of residence. 
The model provides a detailed representation of capital taxation, 
incorporating all of these distinctions. Specifically, the direct taxes in the model 
include taxes on corporate profits, interest income, dividends and capital gains, as 
well as taxes on labour income and on the imputed rent from owner-occupied 
housing (where such a tax exists). The model also includes withholding taxes on 
interest and dividends and a number of policy variables indicating the extent to 
which governments engage in international exchange of information to enforce 
residence-based income taxation. Finally, the model accounts for the various 
                                                 
7 Being static, the model does not illustrate the dynamics of capital stock adjustment and does not 
include adjustment costs. In this sense, the model describes a long-run equilibrium. On the other hand the model 
assumes that national endowments of intangible assets are fixed. In the very long run such assets may become 
mobile internationally, so the time horizon of the model may best be thought of as a medium to long run of about 
10 years. 
 




A general equilibrium in CETAX is established when households and trade 
unions maximise their utilities, firms maximise profits, and all national markets for 
bonds and stocks are clearing. 
The simultaneity of the model means that most endogenous variables depend 
on all model parameters, but some parameters can be assigned the task of generating 
realistic values of certain endogenous variables (see Sørensen, 2001b). When 
calibrating the model, parameters for initial endowments of e.g. wealth and 
intangible assets have thus been chosen so as to generate realistic relative levels of 
GDP and national income. Labour market parameters have been set to replicate 
current unemployment rates, and financial sector fees have been set to produce 
plausible values of the financial sector income ratio in individual countries. In this 
way, calibration and the choice of parameter values have been performed much in 
the same way as in previous applications of the OECDTAX model (e.g. Sørensen, 
2002; 2004a; 2004b). The primary data source for the calibration has been OECD 
national accounts and OECD revenue data, supplemented by various national 
sources for some of the new EU Member States. 
The most contentious calibration issue in the context of this study is the 
calibration of the parameter defining the broadness of the tax base, i.e. the rate of 
depreciation for tax purposes. This parameter is calibrated to replicate the 
empirically observed ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP, so its value depends on 
recorded corporate tax revenue. This figure tends to vary significantly over time and 
even across different data sources (e.g. OECD and Eurostat). Individual country 
results may consequently vary with the data to which the model is calibrated. The 
aggregate effects are, however, less affected by this issue. 
The corporate tax revenue data and corporate tax rates used for the 
calibration of the rate of depreciation for tax purposes are provided in Table 1. 
Because the most recent revenue statistics for corporate income taxes cover the year 
8 2001, corporate tax rates for 2001 have been used to calibrate the rate of 
depreciation for tax purposes, in order to maintain consistency in the calibration.
8  
  When we evaluate the effects of EU tax coordination, we start from a 
baseline equilibrium reflecting the corporate tax rates in force in 2004, which are 
also reported in Table 1. Primary sources for tax data are Eurostat (2003), Eurostat 
(2004), Sørensen (2004a), Martinez-Serrano and Patterson (2003), the Danish 
Ministry of Taxation (2004) and ZEW (2003). 
                                                 
8 An implication of using 2001 as the base year is that German corporate tax revenues are somewhat lower than 
normal due to once-off effects in that year. As a result, the calibrated rate of depreciation for tax purposes 
becomes artificially high for Germany in the model baseline. With Germany being an outlier in terms of its 
relative level of corporate tax revenues already at more normal levels, however, the calibration is unlikely to 
affect any policy conclusions. 
9  
Table 1. Tax data used for calibrating the model   
Member State 
Taxes on corporate 
income (% of 
GDP) 
Corporate tax rate 
(2001) 
Corporate tax rate 
(2004) 
Austria  3.1 34% 34%
Belgium  3.6 40% 34%
Denmark  3.1 30% 30%
Finland  4.9 29% 29%
France  3.4 35% 35%
Germany  0.6 39% 38%
Greece  3.4 37% 35%
Ireland  3.6 20% 12,5%
Italy  3.6 36% 33%
Luxembourg  7.5 37% 30%
Netherlands  4.1 35% 34,5%
Portugal  3.6 35% 27,5%
Spain  2.8 35% 35%
Sweden  2.9 28% 28%
United Kingdom  3.5 30% 30%
Cyprus  2.4 25% 15%
Czech Rep.  4.2 31% 28%
Estonia  0.7 26% 26%
Hungary  2.4 18% 16%
Latvia  2.0 22% 15%
Lithuania  2.0 15% 15%
Malta  2.4 35% 35%
Poland  2.0 28% 19%
Slovak Rep.  2.2 25% 19%
Slovenia  1.4 25% 25%
Note: The corporate tax rate is applied equally to retained and distributed profits, except 
for Estonia, where retained profits are tax exempt. 
Source: Eurostat (2003, 2004), Martinez-Serrano & Patterson (2003), OECD (2003),  
KPMG (2001, 2004), Danish Ministry of Taxation (2004), ZEW (2003) and own  
calculations based on national accounts.     
 
The source of all model elasticities is Sørensen (2002, 2004b). Table 2 
reports selected elasticities in the model. The substitution elasticities between 
different types of assets and the international transaction cost parameters have been 
chosen to generate realistic patterns of portfolio composition. The elasticities 
generate an equilibrium where interest rate differentials are relatively small across 
10 the OECD, as empirically observed, but the calibration of investor preferences also 
reproduces the observed home bias in investor portfolios.  
 
Table 2. Selected model elasticities   
Parameter Value 
Elasticity of saving with respect to the after-tax rate of return  0.2
Elasticity of labour supply with respect to the after-tax wage rate  0.2
Elasticity of substitution between housing assets and financial assets  1
Elasticity of substitution between household saving and institutional saving  1
Elasticity of substitution between stocks and bonds  4
Elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic stocks held by households  3.5
Elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic bonds held by households  4
Source: Sørensen (2002, 2004b).   
 
 
3. Policy scenarios 
Tax coordination encompasses a wide range of possible tax instruments and 
coordination policies. The following sections describe the three scenarios of 
harmonisation of tax rates and tax bases considered in this study. A baseline 
provides a benchmark for the scenario analysis. The baseline equilibrium includes 
all current tax policies in the field of direct taxation in the EU25.  
 
3.1 Full harmonisation 
Our first policy scenario is highly ambitious, envisaging full harmonisation 
of corporate tax bases and tax rates in the EU25 with the purpose of eliminating all 
corporate tax distortions to the cross-country pattern of investment. A harmonised 
tax rate implies that all Member States apply the same statutory rate which is 
imposed equally on retained and distributed profits. A harmonised tax base means 
that all Member States adopt the same rules for calculating the corporate tax bases in 
their respective territories. The broadness of the tax base in the model is determined 
by the rate of capital depreciation and the proportion of interest payments that may 
be deducted against taxable corporate income. The scenario with full harmonisation 
creates a harmonised tax base across the EU25 by assuming that the capital 
allowance rate and the proportion of deductible interest payments will be identical 
for all Member States. All parameters other than the statutory corporate tax rate, the 
11 capital allowance rate and the deductible fraction of interest payments are assumed 
to be unchanged compared to the baseline scenario.
9
The harmonised tax rates and tax bases are calculated as an average across 
the EU25. In one version of the scenario an unweighted average applies, and in a 
second version a GDP-weighted average is considered. 
 
3.2 Tax base harmonisation 
As a compromise between full tax harmonisation and unfettered tax 
competition, some participants in the European policy debate have proposed to 
harmonise the corporate tax base while leaving Member States free to choose their 
own preferred statutory corporate tax rate. With tax base harmonisation European 
multinationals would save on compliance costs, and national differentials in 
statutory tax rates would more accurately reflect differences in effective tax rates, 
increasing the transparency of corporate tax systems. At the same time Member 
States could still compete over statutory tax rates, thus preserving an important 
element of national sovereignty in tax policy. 
Against this background our second scenario assumes full harmonisation of 
corporate tax bases across the EU25. This policy package is identical to the full 
harmonisation scenario with respect to harmonisation of tax bases, but leaves 
statutory tax rates at their current levels. Again, the tax bases are calculated as two 
different (unweighted and GDP-weighted) averages of the current tax bases.  
 
3.3 Enhanced Cooperation 
Enhanced Cooperation between a subset of the Member States is more likely 
than agreement amongst all 25 EU Member States. The legal basis for Enhanced 
Cooperation is the Treaty of Nice, which mandates that at least 8 Member States 
                                                 
9 In particular, all scenarios assume separate accounting, as it is currently the practice, and ignore the issue of 
consolidated accounting, where multinational firms would have a single set of accounts for their EU-wide 
operations. Tax revenues would then be distributed among Member States according to an apportionment 
mechanism. See Sørensen (2004a) for a discussion of such a regime. 
12 must decide to move forward. The perhaps most interesting subset consists of the 12 
Member States that have adopted the Euro as their common currency.
10  
In our scenario with Enhanced Cooperation, we therefore assume that tax 
bases as well as tax rates are harmonised at the unweighted or weighted average 
levels prevailing across the Euro countries only, leaving tax rates and tax bases in 
the other EU Member States at their current levels. 
 
3.4. The method of finance 
Tax coordination will generally affect the total public revenue collected by 
Member States. In order to isolate the ‘pure’ effects of tax coordination, most of our 
analysis will assume that long-run government budget balance is maintained through 
adjustment of (lump-sum) income transfers to households. However, to illustrate the 
importance of the marginal source of public finance, we will also study the effects of 
full harmonisation when tax rates on labour income are adjusted to balance the 
public budget. 
 
4. Effects of tax coordination on economic 
activity, public revenue and consumer welfare 
Two factors explain the majority of the economic effects of corporate tax 
harmonisation. First, harmonisation of both tax rates and tax bases reduces cross-
country differences in effective tax rates, leading to a more efficient allocation of 
capital within the EU as corporate taxes no longer drive a wedge between the 
marginal productivity of capital in the different Member States. The aggregate EU-
wide gain from a more efficient capital allocation may be seen as the pure value-
added from tax coordination. Note that while such a gain will always arise under full 
harmonisation, it may not materialize under tax base harmonisation, because the 
latter scenario will not necessarily reduce cross-country differences in effective 
corporate tax rates.  
                                                 
10 The 12 Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
13 Second, in all scenarios where the public budget is balanced through 
adjustment of public transfers, corporate tax harmonisation will increase the tax 
burden in some countries and reduce it in other countries. The policy changes 
required can be very significant. Individual country results are primarily influenced 
by the change in the overall tax burden. A higher tax burden leads to higher tax 
revenues but causes a loss in GDP due to increased distortions. Conversely, a lower 
tax burden generates a drop in tax revenue and a gain in GDP stemming from greater 
economic efficiency. The aggregate effect of changes to the total level of taxation 
often dominates the effect of a more efficient allocation of capital. Large shifts in 
total tax revenues will in many cases lead to large shifts in GDP. This means that 
economic gains from tax coordination cannot be taken for granted. Depending on the 
specific details of coordination policies and the set of cooperating countries, 
aggregate gains can be reversed into aggregate losses. The details of policy reform 
matter, as will be shown in the following sections. 
 
4.1. Aggregate effects of tax coordination 
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the EU-wide effects of tax coordination in the 
two cases of harmonisation at unweighted and weighted averages, respectively. EU-
wide harmonisation (both full and base harmonisation) leads to gains in both GDP 
and welfare.
11 Harmonisation at unweighted averages leads to a significant drop in 
tax revenues. As explained above, the aggregate effect of changes to the total level 
of taxation can often dominate the effects of a more efficient allocation of capital.  
 
                                                 
11
 Because the labour supply and savings schedules in the CETAX model are derived from a quasi-linear utility 
function that eliminates income effects, our measure of consumer welfare corresponds to the equivalent as well 
as to the compensating variation. 




































































In the case of full harmonisation at the weighted average tax rate and base, 
GDP and welfare are seen to increase by almost 0.4% and 0.1%, respectively, while 
aggregate tax revenue for the EU25 is virtually constant. The aggregate gains in both 
15 GDP and welfare are indicative of the positive effect of a more efficient capital 
allocation, and can be thought of as the pure benefit from tax coordination. 
It may seem surprising that GDP and welfare move in opposite directions in 
the case of Enhanced Cooperation. However, the two variables need not move in 
parallel, since an increase in GDP requires an increase in factor inputs which is 
costly in terms of welfare, and since GDP and national income may be decoupled 
because changes in net capital flows generate changes in income from net foreign 
assets. For example, consider a country that allows strongly accelerated depreciation 
so that even investments with a very low pre-tax rate of return are profitable. If such 
a country is forced to reduce its capital allowance rate as a consequence of tax 
harmonisation, domestic investment and GDP will tend to fall, but national income 
and welfare may increase, since a larger fraction of national savings will be invested 
in the international capital market rather than being used to finance low-productive 
domestic investment. 
The relatively modest magnitude of the welfare gains in Figures 1 and 2 is 
explained by the continued existence of other tax distortions to the cross-country 
pattern of saving and investment within the EU (see Sørensen, 2004a). Tax rules for 
household and institutional investors still differ across Member States. In particular, 
the taxation of corporate source income at the shareholder level continues to differ 
across countries. Investors are furthermore home-biased in their decision making, 
which reduces the substitutability of assets. Moreover, a significant part of total 
capital stocks is invested outside the corporate sector, particularly in housing capital. 
Corporate tax harmonisation alone is therefore not enough to equalize the cost of 
capital across the EU. 
 
4.2. Effects of tax harmonisation on individual Member States 
Though the aggregate effects of tax coordination are quite modest at the EU 
level, individual country effects are large and divergent, as illustrated in Table 3, 
which considers the scenario with full harmonisation at unweighted averages. The 
table shows that individual countries will experience sizeable changes in economic 
activity and tax revenues. Two conclusions emerge. First, harmonisation of the 
corporate tax base implies very large changes to the rules determining taxable 
corporate income in some countries. In particular, Germany is an outlier in the EU15 
16 because of its narrow tax base. Second, for almost all countries, a gain in GDP 
comes at the cost of lower tax revenues. Conversely, a loss in GDP is generally 
accompanied by higher tax revenues. As previously noted, this is because changes in 
the level of distortionary taxation tend to outweigh all other effects at the country 
level when government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers to offset 
changes in tax revenues.  
 




















Austria 0.7  0.2 -0.3 -6.8  0.1
Belgium 3.2  0.6 -0.2 -6.8  43.2
Denmark 1.8  0.3 -0.2 -2.8  57.4
Finland 1.6  0.2 -0.3 -1.8  73.9
France 2.4  0.4 -0.4 -7.8  36.2
Germany -1.6  0.1 0.2 -10.8  -54.6
Greece 1.1  0.2 -0.2 -7.8  -3.2
Ireland -1.0  -0.1 0.7 14.7  7.8
Italy 1.4  0.2 -0.5 -5.8  23.5
Luxembourg  3.7 0.6 -1.3 -3.2 201.7
Netherlands 2.7  0.4 -0.6 -7.3  52.5
Portugal 1.2  0.2 -0.4 -0.3  53.8
Spain 0.4  0.3 -0.1 -7.8  -11.0
Sweden 1.1  0.2 -0.2 -0.8  44.5
UK  2.2 0.3 -0.8 -2.8 122.1
Cyprus -1.2  -0.1 1.0 12.2  -12.7
Czech  Rep.  2.3 0.2 -0.8 -0.8 134.5
Estonia -2.4  -0.1 1.3 1.2  -73.4
Hungary 0.5  -0.1 0.0 11.2  162.7
Latvia 0.1  0.0 0.4 12.2  98.4
Lithuania  0.4 0.0 0.3 12.2 176.1
Malta -1.1  0.0 0.0 -7.8  -40.4
Poland -1.1  -0.2 0.6 8.2  -24.0
Slovak Rep.  -0.7  -0.1 0.5 8.2  1.9
Slovenia -1.7  -0.1 0.5 2.2  -48.2
EU25  0.8  0.2 -0.2      
Note: The harmonised corporate tax rate is 27.2%.     
Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers.     
Source: CETAX simulations.         
 
17 This analysis highlights some fundamental dilemmas for any policy of tax 
harmonisation. On the one hand harmonisation cannot generate any aggregate 
efficiency gain from an improved allocation of capital unless national tax systems 
differ from the outset. On the other hand these initial differences in national tax 
policies inevitably mean that tax harmonisation creates losers as well as winners. As 
long as decisions on EU tax harmonisation require unanimity among the Member 
States, it is thus inconceivable that any agreement could be reached without some 
kind of compensating transfers from the winning to the losing countries. 
But this points to another dilemma: Any compensation scheme must identify 
winners and losers. If losers are defined as those countries where tax revenues fall as 
a result of harmonisation, the implication would be that countries suffering drops in 
GDP (and welfare) would compensate countries with gains in GDP (and welfare). If, 
on the other hand, losers are defined as those countries where GDP decreases as a 
result of the reforms, the implication would be that countries suffering drops in tax 
revenues would compensate countries with gains in tax revenues. Both options will 
prove hard to accept for policy makers. 
A further dilemma arises from the fact that the (sometimes significant) 
changes in Member State revenues implied by tax harmonisation can hardly be 
absorbed without a noticeable impact on the internal distribution of income and 
welfare within Member States. Presumably, this makes tax harmonisation even more 
controversial.  
 
4.2 Enhanced Cooperation versus full harmonisation 
The analysis above suggests that although the aggregate efficiency gain from 
tax harmonisation will be smaller, the gain will be less unevenly distributed the 
greater the similarity between the initial national tax systems. Moreover, 
harmonisation will generate savings on compliance and administration costs that are 
not included in our model analysis,
12 and these gains will be shared by all countries 
engaging in harmonisation. Because of the more equal distribution of gains, it seems 
more likely that a more homogeneous group of countries like the members of the 
                                                 
12 For example, when statutory corporate tax rates are equalized across the EU, the need to enforce complex 
transfer pricing rules for transactions within the Union essentially vanishes. 
18 euro zone could reach an agreement on tax harmonisation. This is the rationale for 
considering the effects of Enhanced Cooperation involving corporate tax 
harmonisation within the euro zone. 
Figures 3 and 4 confirm that the dispersion of the net gains from 
harmonisation of tax rates as well as tax bases would indeed be smaller within the 
euro zone than within the EU25. However, the difference in the degree of dispersion 
is seen to be relatively small, and the simulations underlying Figures 3 and 4 reveal 
that the difference between harmonisation at the unweighted or weighted average 
corporate tax rate and tax base is more pronounced in the case of Enhanced 
Cooperation, compared to the scenario with full harmonisation. In case of Enhanced 
Cooperation for the euro zone, harmonisation at unweighted averages tends to imply 
losses in GDP and gains in tax revenues, whereas harmonisation at weighted 
averages yields opposite results. 
 


































































The differences are to a large extent driven by individual country impacts, 
most notably by the impact on Germany, which has the largest economy in the EU. 
As previously noted, the German economy is an outlier in the sense that the tax base 
is very narrow compared to other EU15 Member States. When harmonisation takes 
place at the unweighted average tax rate and tax base, the German tax base is 
drastically increased, leading to a sharp increase in the total corporate tax burden 
and an accompanying fall in economic activity. Because Germany constitutes 
around one fifth of the total EU economy, this effect has a strong impact on the 
results for Enhanced Cooperation at unweighted averages. 
Against this background, harmonisation at the weighted average tax rate and 
base may seem a tempting alternative for Enhanced Cooperation, since it involves a 
smaller dispersion of the effects of harmonisation. However, such a scenario implies 
that the rules for determining the harmonised tax base must be heavily oriented 
towards replicating the effects of German tax legislation. 
  
4.3 Tax base harmonisation versus full harmonisation 
The economic effects of tax base harmonisation are conceptually different 
from full harmonisation. When only the tax base is harmonised, substantial 
differences in effective corporate tax rates will remain. In fact, if countries with 
20 relatively broad tax bases tend to have relatively low tax rates, and vice versa, tax 
base harmonisation may lead to an increase in effective tax rate differences. The 
implication is that cross-country distortions to investment decisions may remain or 
even increase, thereby eliminating any gains from the improved capital allocation 
that follows full harmonisation. 
Still, tax base harmonisation can result in economic gains as illustrated in 
Figure 1 and Figure 2. The gains in GDP and welfare are primarily a result of the 
overall drop in taxation. The decrease in tax revenues is the effect of harmonising 
only one of the two components determining corporate tax revenues (the other 
component is the statutory tax rate). Specifically, the drop in aggregate revenue 
reflects that it is mainly the small EU countries which are forced to broaden their tax 
bases whereas most of the large Member States (except Germany) must increase 
their capital allowance rates. When government budgets are balanced by adjusting 
income transfers, lower taxation increases investment and economic activity. 
As was the case for full harmonisation, individual country effects are 
significantly larger than the aggregate effect for the EU as a whole. There are still 
clear winners and losers from harmonisation, and the span between the biggest 
positive and negative outcome is considerable (see Tables A.3 and A.4 in the 
appendix). 
An important motivation for harmonising tax bases is to reduce tax 
compliance costs for firms with multinational operations in the Internal Market. The 
costs of complying with the corporate tax code – which are not included in our 
model - are generally estimated to amount to 2-4% of corporate tax revenues (Lanno 
& Levin, 2002). However, solid evidence on compliance costs is scarce and the 
estimated magnitude of these costs differs quite a lot across studies.
13 In recognition 
of the problem, the Commission recently launched a comprehensive survey of the 
compliance costs associated with company taxation and VAT. Analysis of 
quantitative estimates provided by 700 companies in 14 EU Member States suggests 
that compliance costs in the EU amount to 1.9% of taxes paid.  
                                                 
13 Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993) have estimated tax compliance costs for the USA, Pope et al (1990) for 
Australia, Sandford (1995) for the United Kingdom, Erard (1997) for Canada, and Allers (1994) for the 
Netherlands. The Ruding Committee has surveyed EC and EFTA countries (European Commission, 1992). 
21 Table 3 implicitly also provides insights into the issue of compliance costs. 
The large adjustments to tax bases that sometimes are required by harmonisation 
indicate that existing rules for calculating taxable corporate income differ 
significantly across countries. This suggests that tax base harmonisation could result 
in sizeable reductions in compliance costs. The present study may therefore 
underestimate the gains from tax coordination. However, as long as statutory tax rate 
differentials remain, multinationals will have an incentive to engage in international 
profit-shifting via transfer-pricing, and hence the present complex transfer-pricing 
regulations will have to be maintained, at least as long as the corporate tax base is 
allocated across countries by the method of separate accounting.
14 The saving of 
compliance costs would therefore be smaller under tax base harmonisation than 
under full harmonisation. 
 
4.4. Budget balancing through adjustment of the labour income tax 
  Coordination of corporate taxes can have substantial effects on tax revenues. 
Full harmonisation yields significant revenue gains in some countries and 
considerable losses in others (see Table 3). The large effects imply that corporate tax 
cooperation is likely to be bundled with reforms of other parts of the tax system. 
  Most countries lose revenues. If labour income taxes are used instead of 
income transfers to balance the government budgets, these countries experience 
smaller gains in GDP and welfare and some even experience a small loss in GDP, as 
shown in Table 4.  
Some countries, including Germany and Estonia, gain revenues from a full 
harmonisation of corporate taxation (again, see Table 3). The welfare impacts are 
positive in some cases, e.g. Germany, as the tax system is now less distortionary, 
and negative in other cases, e.g., Estonia, where distortions have increased. All of 
these countries experience gains, however, if they use the larger corporate tax 
revenues to reduce labour income taxes. Unemployment rates decrease accordingly. 
The EU as a whole continues to gain from tax coordination if labour income 
taxes are used to keep government budgets balanced, as shown in Figure 5.  
                                                 
14 In principle the transfer-pricing problem could be solved if the corporate tax base were apportioned by a fixed 
formula, as proposed by the European Commission (2001a). However, formula apportionment has its own 
problems, as discussed by Sørensen (2004a). 















Austria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Belgium 1.3 0.4 0.0 0.3 
Denmark 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 
Finland 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 
France 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.7 
Germany -2.1 0.2 0.0 -0.3 
Greece -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 
Ireland 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.2 
Italy 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Luxembourg 3.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 
Netherlands 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.2 
Portugal 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Spain -0.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 
Sweden 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 
UK 1.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Cyprus -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
Czech Rep.  1.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Estonia -1.1 0.2 0.0 -0.3 
Hungary 0.9 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Latvia 0.6 0.1 0.0 -0.1 
Lithuania 0.8 0.1 0.0 -0.1 
Malta -1.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
Poland -0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.4 
Slovak Rep.  0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
Slovenia -0.8 0.2 0.0 -0.3 
EU25 0.6 0.1 0.0    
Note: The tax bases and rates are harmonised at the unweighted EU25 average. 
Government budgets are balanced by adjusting the labour income tax rates. 





23 Figure 5. Budget balancing through adjustment of the labour income tax 

































4.5. A summary comparison of policy scenarios 
This section provides summary tables with results from the different 
scenarios. Table 5 compares full harmonisation to tax base harmonisation, assuming 
that coordination involves all of the EU25 countries. The table shows that full 
harmonisation at weighted averages is the most attractive policy option for corporate 
tax coordination if the overall level of taxation is to be kept unchanged for the EU as 
a whole. Larger gains can be achieved only by lower (effective) tax rates resulting in 
lower tax revenues. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of full and base harmonisation    
   Full harmonisation  Base harmonisation 








GDP (%)  0.8 0.4 0.2  0.3
Welfare (% of GDP)  0.2 0.1 0.0  0.1
Total tax revenues (% of GDP)  -0.2 0.0 -0.1  -0.1
Note: Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers   
Source: CETAX simulations.         
 
 
24 The picture is a bit more complex for the case of Enhanced Cooperation, but 
the basic policy conclusion remains the same. We have so far assumed that 
Enhanced Cooperation would involve full harmonisation of tax bases and tax rates 
within the euro zone, but the euro countries might of course choose to cooperate 
only on tax base harmonisation. Figure 6 illustrates the difference between these 
alternatives. The figure shows that only full harmonisation at weighted averages 
consistently results in both GDP and welfare gains. 
 







































In summary, it appears that full harmonisation of both the corporate tax rate 
and the corporate tax base, at the weighted averages of current rates and bases, is the 
most interesting option from an economic point of view. As previously noted, this is 
because full harmonisation at weighted averages comes closest to realizing the 
benefits from improved capital allocation without affecting the level of taxation. 
 
5. Conclusions and caveats 
This study offers new insights into the issue of corporate tax coordination in 
the European Union. In particular, it suggests that the aggregate efficiency gains 
from corporate tax harmonisation are likely to be rather small, because many 
25 important forms of saving and investment outside the corporate sector would 
continue to be subject to widely diverging national tax rules, just as personal tax 
rates on corporate source income would continue to differ. Indeed, according to the 
estimates presented in Sørensen (2001), the efficiency gain from a full 
harmonisation of all taxes on capital income in the EU could be about four times as 
large as the estimated gain from corporate tax harmonisation in the present study. 
This underscores the importance of allowing for the fact that the corporation tax is 
only one component in the wider complex of capital income taxes. 
Moreover, our study points to some fundamental dilemmas raised by any 
policy involving full or partial harmonisation of national corporate tax systems. The 
allocation gains from harmonisation arise because national tax systems differ from 
the outset, but these very differences also imply that some countries are bound to 
lose from harmonisation. Hence agreement on harmonisation is unlikely unless the 
gainers are willing to somehow compensate the losers. But here the next dilemma 
arises: if losers are defined as those countries where tax revenues fall as a result of 
harmonisation, the implication would be that countries suffering drops in GDP 
would compensate countries with gains in GDP. If, on the other hand, losers are 
defined as those countries where GDP decreases as a result of harmonisation, 
countries suffering drops in tax revenues would have to compensate countries with 
gains in tax revenues. In both cases it seems unlikely that a compensation scheme 
would be acceptable to all Member States. 
The large and diverse country effects of full harmonisation suggest that 
Enhanced Cooperation for a subset of the Member States may be the most realistic 
(or least unlikely) route towards tax coordination. Both full harmonisation and tax 
base harmonisation across the EU as a whole seems politically infeasible given the 
unanimity requirement on tax policy decisions. Coordination among a subset of 
relatively homogeneous Member States will lead to less radical policy changes, but 
also to smaller gains. Yet Enhanced Cooperation could constitute a first step towards 
corporate tax coordination. Indeed, Tables A.5 and A.6 in the appendix indicate that 
only Germany and Ireland would lose from Enhanced Cooperation on corporate 
taxation within the euro zone. 
The unanimity rule for tax policy decisions implies that all countries have an 
equal say. Given the general tendency of governments to favour national sovereignty 
26 on corporate taxation, the unanimity rule makes harmonisation at a level close to the 
unweighted average of current systems most relevant. 
Harmonisation at the weighted average of current tax rates and tax bases 
implies that large economies are given more influence in determining the 
harmonised tax base and tax rate. The present study suggests that this makes more 
economic sense, but it also implies a larger dent in the national sovereignty of small 
Member States, representing yet another dilemma for tax coordination. 
Although the choice of the specific level of harmonisation may seem a 
purely technical issue, the policy implications are profound. Our study reveals a 
large difference between harmonisation at the unweighted and weighted averages of 
current corporate tax rates and bases. For Enhanced Cooperation on full 
harmonisation, the difference is a question of either aggregate gains or aggregate 
losses. Enhanced Cooperation involving a smaller and more homogeneous group of 
countries may therefore be preferred because of the need for very specific 
agreements on the details of tax coordination. 
The present study has focused on the static allocative gains from eliminating 
existing corporate tax differentials within the EU. It suggests that these gains will be 
rather small. However, tax harmonisation may create other types of gain that are not 
included in our analysis. 
First, harmonisation will reduce the costs of tax compliance and tax 
administration, as we have already mentioned. 
Second, even if there were no initial differences in national tax systems and 
hence no potential efficiency gain from a better cross-country allocation of capital, 
tax coordination might still generate a welfare gain by eliminating corporate tax 
competition among EU Member States. In particular, many scholars have 
emphasized that tax competition will tend to cause an under-provision of public 
goods or an undesirable shift of the tax burden from capital to labour.
15 On the other 
hand, many observers and policy makers have argued that tax competition has the 
beneficial effect of improving public sector efficiency. But even if this is the case, 
some amount of tax coordination (e.g. a required minimum effective corporate tax 
                                                 
15
 See the literature surveys by Wilson (1999) and Zodrow (2003). 
27 rate) is still likely to be welfare-improving by offsetting the tendency towards under-
provision of public goods, as shown by Eggert and Sørensen (2006). 
Third, and related to the previous point, unfettered tax competition may also 
constrain the ability of governments to engage in redistributive taxation. For 
egalitarian governments, the resulting increase in inequality may entail a social 
welfare cost which could be avoided through tax coordination (see Sørensen (2004c) 
for an attempt to quantify this type of gain from coordination). Again, our analysis 
does not account for such an effect of tax coordination. 
Still, by pointing to some fundamental dilemmas for international tax 
coordination, the present study may help to explain why EU Member States have 
been so reluctant to cooperate on tax policy.
28 Appendix: Detailed tables 




















Austria 0.7  0.2 -0.3 -6.8  0.1
Belgium 3.2  0.6 -0.2 -6.8  43.2
Denmark 1.8  0.3 -0.2 -2.8  57.4
Finland 1.6  0.2 -0.3 -1.8  73.9
France 2.4  0.4 -0.4 -7.8  36.2
Germany -1.6  0.1 0.2 -10.8  -54.6
Greece 1.1  0.2 -0.2 -7.8  -3.2
Ireland -1.0  -0.1 0.7 14.7  7.8
Italy 1.4  0.2 -0.5 -5.8  23.5
Luxembourg 3.7  0.6 -1.3 -3.2  201.7
Netherlands 2.7  0.4 -0.6 -7.3  52.5
Portugal 1.2  0.2 -0.4 -0.3  53.8
Spain 0.4  0.3 -0.1 -7.8  -11.0
Sweden 1.1  0.2 -0.2 -0.8  44.5
UK 2.2  0.3 -0.8 -2.8  122.1
Cyprus -1.2  -0.1 1.0 12.2  -12.7
Czech Rep.  2.3  0.2 -0.8 -0.8  134.5
Estonia -2.4  -0.1 1.3 1.2  -73.4
Hungary 0.5  -0.1 0.0 11.2  162.7
Latvia 0.1  0.0 0.4 12.2  98.4
Lithuania 0.4  0.0 0.3 12.2  176.1
Malta -1.1  0.0 0.0 -7.8  -40.4
Poland -1.1  -0.2 0.6 8.2  -24.0
Slovak Rep.  -0.7  -0.1 0.5 8.2  1.9
Slovenia -1.7  -0.1 0.5 2.2  -48.2
EU25  0.8  0.2 -0.2      
Note: The harmonised corporate tax rate is 27.2%       
Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers.     
Source: CETAX simulations.         
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Austria 0.4  0.1 -0.1 -1.4  5.6
Belgium 2.4  0.5 -0.1 -1.4  51.2
Denmark 1.3  0.2 -0.1 2.6  66.1
Finland 1.2  0.1 -0.1 3.6  83.5
France 2.0  0.3 -0.3 -2.4  43.7
Germany -2.1  -0.1 0.4 -5.4  -52.1
Greece 0.6  0.1 0.0 -2.4  2.1
Ireland -1.3  -0.2 0.8 20.1  13.7
Italy 1.1  0.1 -0.3 -0.4  30.3
Luxembourg 3.4  0.5 -0.7 2.2  218.3
Netherlands 2.3  0.3 -0.4 -1.9  60.9
Portugal 0.8  0.1 -0.2 5.1  62.3
Spain 0.0  0.1 0.0 -2.4  -6.1
Sweden 0.7  0.0 -0.1 4.6  52.5
UK 1.9  0.2 -0.6 2.6  134.3
Cyprus -1.4  -0.2 1.3 17.3  -7.8
Czech Rep.  2.0  0.1 -0.5 4.5  144.4
Estonia -2.6  -0.1 1.5 6.5  -71.3
Hungary 0.3  -0.2 0.1 16.2  173.6
Latvia -0.2  0.0 0.7 17.3  107.7
Lithuania 0.1  -0.1 0.5 17.5  190.5
Malta -1.4  -0.1 0.3 -2.4  -36.9
Poland -1.3  -0.3 0.7 13.5  -19.7
Slovak Rep.  -0.9  -0.2 0.8 13.5  7.5
Slovenia -1.9  -0.2 0.7 7.4  -44.4
EU25  0.4  0.1 0.0      
Note: The harmonised corporate tax rate is 32.6%.     
Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers.     
Source: CETAX simulations.         
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Austria 0.0  0.0 0.0   0.1
Belgium 1.8  0.4 -0.1   43.2
Denmark 1.5  0.3 -0.1   57.4
Finland 1.5  0.2 -0.2   73.9
France 1.4  0.1 -0.2   36.2
Germany -3.2  -0.3 0.6   -54.6
Greece -0.2  0.0 0.0   -3.2
Ireland 0.1  0.0 0.0   7.8
Italy 0.8  0.1 -0.2   23.5
Luxembourg 3.4  0.5 -0.9   201.7
Netherlands 1.8  0.2 -0.3   52.5
Portugal 1.3  0.2 -0.3   53.8
Spain -0.6  -0.1 0.1   -11.0
Sweden 1.1  0.1 -0.1   44.5
UK 2.1  0.2 -0.6   122.1
Cyprus -0.2  0.0 0.1   -12.7
Czech Rep.  2.3  0.2 -0.7   134.5
Estonia -0.9  0.0 -0.3   -73.4
Hungary 1.3  0.1 -0.4   162.8
Latvia 0.9  0.0 -0.4   98.4
Lithuania 1.3  0.1 -0.5   176.2
Malta -1.8  -0.1 0.5   -40.4
Poland -0.4  0.0 0.1   -24.0
Slovak Rep.  0.0  0.0 0.0   1.9
Slovenia -1.5  0.0 0.4   -48.2
EU25  0.2  0.0 -0.1      
Note: Statutory corporate tax rates are unchanged.     
Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers.     
Source: CETAX simulations.         
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Austria 0.2  0.0 0.0   5.6
Belgium 2.0  0.4 -0.1   51.2
Denmark 1.7  0.3 -0.1   66.1
Finland 1.7  0.2 -0.2   83.5
France 1.6  0.1 -0.3   43.7
Germany -3.0  -0.3 0.6   -52.1
Greece 0.0  0.0 0.0   2.1
Ireland 0.1  0.0 0.0   13.7
Italy 1.0  0.1 -0.2   30.3
Luxembourg 3.6  0.6 -1.0   218.3
Netherlands 2.0  0.2 -0.3   60.9
Portugal 1.4  0.2 -0.4   62.3
Spain -0.3  0.0 0.1   -6.1
Sweden 1.2  0.1 -0.2   52.5
UK 2.2  0.3 -0.7   134.3
Cyprus -0.1  0.0 0.1   -7.9
Czech Rep.  2.4  0.2 -0.8   147.5
Estonia -0.9  0.0 -0.3   -71.9
Hungary 1.4  0.1 -0.4   177.3
Latvia 0.9  0.1 -0.4   109.3
Lithuania 1.4  0.1 -0.5   191.4
Malta -1.7  -0.1 0.5   -37.1
Poland -0.4  0.0 0.1   -19.8
Slovak Rep.  0.1  0.0 0.0   7.5
Slovenia -1.3  0.0 0.4   -45.3
EU25  0.3  0.1 -0.1      
Note: Statutory corporate tax rates are unchanged.      
Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers.     
Source: CETAX simulations.         
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Austria -0.1  0.0 0.0 -2.5  -10.4
Belgium 1.9  0.4 0.0 -2.5  28.2
Denmark 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Finland 0.9  0.1 -0.1 2.5  55.6
France 1.5  0.2 -0.2 -3.5  21.9
Germany -2.6  -0.1 0.5 -6.5  -59.3
Greece 0.0  0.1 0.1 -3.5  -13.4
Ireland -1.6  -0.3 0.9 19.0  -3.6
Italy 0.6  0.1 -0.2 -1.5  10.5
Luxembourg 3.0  0.3 -0.8 1.1  170.0
Netherlands 1.8  0.3 -0.3 -3.0  36.5
Portugal 0.4  0.0 -0.1 4.0  37.7
Spain -0.5  0.1 0.1 -3.5  -20.3
Sweden 0.0  0.0 0.0    
UK 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Cyprus 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Czech Rep.  0.0  0.0 0.0    
Estonia 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Hungary 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Latvia 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Lithuania 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Malta 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Poland 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Slovak Rep.  0.0  0.0 0.0    
Slovenia 0.0  0.0 0.0    
EU25  -0.1  0.1 0.0      
Note: The harmonised corporate tax rate is 31.5%.      
Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers.     
Source: CETAX simulations.         
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Austria 0.6  0.1 -0.1 0.7  20.5
Belgium 2.5  0.5 -0.2 0.7  72.4
Denmark 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Finland 1.4  0.1 -0.2 5.7  109.3
France 2.2  0.2 -0.4 -0.3  64.0
Germany -1.9  -0.1 0.4 -3.3  -45.3
Greece 0.8  0.1 -0.1 -0.3  16.5
Ireland -1.1  -0.3 0.7 22.2  29.7
Italy 1.4  0.1 -0.3 1.7  48.6
Luxembourg 3.7  0.5 -0.6 4.3  263.2
Netherlands 2.6  0.3 -0.4 0.2  83.6
Portugal 1.0  0.0 -0.3 7.2  85.2
Spain 0.3  0.0 -0.1 -0.3  7.1
Sweden 0.0  0.0 0.0    
UK 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Cyprus 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Czech Rep.  0.0  0.0 0.0    
Estonia 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Hungary 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Latvia 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Lithuania 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Malta 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Poland 0.0  0.0 0.0    
Slovak Rep.  0.0  0.0 0.0    
Slovenia 0.0  0.0 0.0    
EU25  0.4  0.1 0.0      
Note: The harmonised corporate tax rate is 34.7%.      
Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers.     
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